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Abstract
Denial-of-service (DoS) attack exploits inherent limitation of resources in wireless networks in attempt to
overwhelm and exhaust their finite capacity. In wireless networks, clear-text form of control packets (CP) exhibits a
security flaw that can be exploited by attackers to render the networks incapable of providing normal services.
While these attacks are quite damaging in terms of consuming available processing and bandwidth resources, they
are easy to conduct against the wireless networks. In this study, we propose two distinct models to prevent
wireless DoS and replay attacks based on trust in CP for IEEE 802.11 wireless networks. The first model is based on
original HMAC-SHA1 algorithm and the second one is based on a proposed modified HMAC-SHA1 (M-hmac)
algorithm. Both models are implemented and the results are obtained and evaluated based on a number of
metrics. The results show that the two models successfully prevent both wireless DoS and replay attacks. In
addition, the newly proposed M-hmac algorithm provides better network performance in term of the metrics.
Keywords: DoS attacks, hash functions, modified HMAC-SHA1, replay attack, control packets
1. Introduction
There are various types of security protocols in wireless
networks that protect data packets during transmission
such as WEP, WPA, and 802.11i. Despite providing dif-
ferent levels of security, these security protocols are not
able to protect control packets (CP). Consequently, the
CP including RTS, CTS, ACK, CF-End, and CF-End-
ACK are transmitted in clear-text form. Wireless CPs
contain a 2-byte duration field with 32767 μs maximum
value used to set the network allocation vector (NAV).
The field shows the time that the channel will be kept
busy by the originator node. During this time, other
nodes are not allowed to transmit and must wait until
NAV reaches zero. Because CP are not protected, it is
possible for the attackers to generate false CP with large
duration values in order to trigger denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks. The intention is to overload the target
wireless networks and crash the systems by quickly con-
suming the networks’ capacities.
The attackers may continuously transmit false CP to
the target wireless network within short intervals. The
target network has to accept the false CP because the
802.11 standard does not provide any mechanism to dis-
tinguish the true CPs from the false [1-3]. Reception of
large number of false CP within a short time will
quickly consume the network resources until the access
point (AP) becomes overloaded and crashed. When this
happens, the AP has to disconnect all the users who are
at the time connected to the network as it comes to a
complete halt and shutdown. While these attacks are
easy to implement, they have highly negative impact so
that completely shut down the wireless networks and
significantly degrade the quality of services.
In this study, two distinct models are proposed to dis-
tinguish the trust-based CP belonging to the authorized
users from the false CP belonging to the attackers. The
models enable the recipients to investigate the CP and
analyze information contained in their security elements
in order to accept trusted CP and discard false CP. The
proposed models support all types of CP and are able to
prevent both DoS attacks and replay attacks with suffi-
cient level of security.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
Related studies are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 pre-
sents the structures of the two proposed models. Section
4 details out the experimental setup to implement the
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models. Section 5 presents the experimental results and
discussion. Finally, Section 6 concludes the article.
2. Related studies
In order to address the wireless DoS attacks, different
schemes have been proposed. The schemes can be clas-
sified into three general methods, namely, cryptographic,
detection, and NAV validation methods. Table 1 sum-
marizes the strategies adopted by these schemes and
highlights the corresponding weaknesses.
Despite all the benefits getting from the proposed
schemes in Table 1, there are still a number of notable
weak points. Each scheme only addresses a specific issue
from the entire security problem, therefore, requires com-
plementary solutions. The schemes are still vulnerable to
replay attacks. In addition, ignoring protection of conten-
tion-free CP by these schemes keeps the DoS attacks a
threat against wireless networks. These drawbacks lead to
a need to provide a security model so that while it is able
to prevent the DoS and replay attacks by protecting all
types of CP, it does not impose significant security cost to
the wireless networks compared to the 802.11 standard
model which are the main focus of this study.
3. Overall structure of the proposed models
In order to prevent wireless DoS and replay attacks, we
propose two distinct models that provide secure control
packets (SCPs). The first model employs original
HMAC-SHA1 as the underlying authentication algo-
rithm, which we refer to as O-hmac. Because it is based
on O-hmac, we named the first proposed model as
SCP-O. For the second proposed model, there are two
steps involved. First, we propose some modifications
over the HMAC-SHA1 and we refer to the modified
version as M-hmac.
The main purpose of the M-hmac is to reduce the
security cost and communication overheads of O-hmac
while at the same time optimizing its performance. M-
hmac is then used as the underlying authentication algo-
rithm of the second proposed model, which is called
SCP-M.
Implementation of the SCP-O involves three main
parts which are proposed key derivation algorithm
(KDA), creating two new security elements, and pro-
posed replay-preventing mechanism. In contrast, imple-
mentation of the SCP-M in addition to these three parts
requires one additional part to develop the proposed M-
hmac. These four parts are presented in Figure 1 while
the overall structure and implementation process of
each part are explained in the following sections.
3.1. Proposed KDA
The implementation of both SCP-M and SCP-O models
requires a key, while protection of the key that is shared
Table 1 Wireless DoS attacks prevention schemes




Cryptographic Add transmitter address to CTS and ACK packets;
authentication using hmac-MD5 or hmac-sha1 of 80-
160b




Cryptographic Change CRC-32 to CRC-16 and use PRF-16 from
hmac-sha1
The model has three drawbacks: modifying CRC which is
used for all other types of packets, short security field,
and inability to prevent replay attacks
Bicakci and Tavli
(2009) [3]
Cryptographic Symmetric algorithm to encrypt/hash function to
authenticate the CP




Cryptographic Encryption using PRF-160 bits The model only protects polling CP while still DoS
attacks are possible using other types of CP
Chen et al. (2007)
[20]
Detection DoS attacks detection using CUSUM The model only detects RTS and CTS DoS attacks while
incapable of detecting DoS using other CP. Besides it is





Detection Keep track of statistical distribution pattern of CP
when a uniform pattern only belongs to attacker
The model provides only detection while unable to
prevent the DoS attacks
Zhang et al.
(2008) [23]
Detection ENAV to give enough time to sender of data fame to
receive ACK packet
The model only protects ACK packet while DoS attack is




Validation Introduce a new packet called CTSR to revoke the
NAV if no data is sensed after RTS or CTS
transmission
Unprotected new CTSR frame causes a new DoS attacks
itself. Besides, the model is not able to prevent DoS
attacks using other types of CP
Chen et al. (2003)
[25]
Validation Two timers as RTS-DATA and CTS-ACK to check
reception of data and ACK packets, respectively




Validation Place limit on duration value of CP: ACK duration
must be zero, discarding RTS if data frames is not
sensed, ignoring isolated CTS packets
The model does not specify prevention of contention-
free DoS attacks. Besides ignoring CTS packets while
they may belong to hidden nodes can significantly
degrade wireless network performance
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between the communication parties is an important
consideration. We assume the users in wireless network
to be equipped with a shared key K of length k bits.
Nonetheless, applying the main shared key directly
through the communications is insecure [4]. Based on
this argument, we propose a new KDA used during the
SCP transmissions. The proposed KDA hashes the main
shared key with two rationales behind the design.
First, the length of the hashed password is longer than
length of the original key, thus the hashed key is harder
to compromise. If the length of original key is k bits,
then there are 2k possible values that the attacker has to
expose. However, for a hashed key with n bits where n
> k, the number of attempts for the attacker to break
the key is 2n, where 2n > 2k. This means that the
attacker will be dealing with a more difficult task to
reveal the value of the hashed key.
Second, hash functions are one-way algorithms.
Therefore, finding the original key from the hash results
demands high effort which can make it practically infea-
sible [4].
On the other hand, although hashing a key can be
useful in strengthening security [5] as compared to
using a shorter plaintext key, it is still possible for the
attacker to compromise the key using the rainbow table
attacks [6]. To avoid this issue, we incorporate two addi-
tional cryptographic salts to the original shared key
before the key is being hashed. A cryptographic salt is
additional information that is added to the main key
before hashing takes place [7] which makes the key dis-
closure attacks (e.g., rainbow table attack) slower and
more difficult [8].
In this study, we apply two cryptographic salts. The
first cryptographic salt is referred to as cryptsalt1 using
the network name (SSID) as the value. The second cryp-
tographic salt is referred to as cryptsalt2 using the MAC
address of AP (BSSID) as the value. The cryptsalt1 is
appended to the original shared key to generate a cryp-
tographic-salted-key as follow.
Cryptographic − salted − key = Original shared key
‖ cryptsalt1
where ‖ is concatenation
Once the salted cryptographic key is generated, the
following processes are performed to generate the final
key (FK) for both SCP-O and SCP-M models to be used
during subsequent SCPs transmissions instead of the
original key.
3.1.1. Generating FK for the SCP-O model
To generate the FK for the SCP-O model which is
called FK-SCP-O, we consider cryptsalt2 as the input to
the O-hmac algorithm with the cryptographic-salted-key
as the key to generate FK-SCP-O key with 160 bits
length as follow.
FK − SCP − O = O − hmac [(original shared key
‖ cryptsalt1), cryptsalt2]
3.1.2. Generating FK for the SCP-M model
The process of the key generation for the SCP-M model
is different from key generation for the SCP-O model.
To generate the FK for the SCP-M model which is
called FK-SCP-M, we employ the first round of the M-
hmac algorithm. Nevertheless, we exclude the second
round of M-hmac in the key derivation because of the
fact that a longer key poses harder constraints to decode
the key value by the attackers. The length of the output









Proposed key derivation algorithm (KDA) 
Creating two new security fields (TS, AF) 










Figure 1 Corresponding parts in the SCP-O and SCP-M models.
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round, which leads us to use only the first round of M-
hmac.
We enter cryptsalt2 as the input to the first round of
M-hmac algorithm with the cryptographic-salted-key as
the key to generate FK-SCP-M key with a length of 160
bits as follow.
FK − SCP − M = First round of M − hmac [
(original shared key ‖ cryptsalt1), cryptsalt2]
The overall process of the proposed KDAs is
described in Figure 2.
3.2. New security fields: TS and AF
To ensure security, imposing extra overheads to the net-
works is unavoidable [9]. However, because of the fact
that wireless networks have limited resources [10], it is
required to keep the overheads as small as possible. In
this study, we define two new security fields, TS and
AF, to construct the SCP as follows.
• TS field: This field carries creation time of the CP and
is used to verify their freshness. The TS field is 4 bytes
























Corresponding Model  
Figure 2 Proposed KDA for the SCP-O and SCP-M models.
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• AF field: In order to verify integrity of the received
CP and identify the validity of their originator, a new
field called the authenticator field (AF) is created. This
field is attached following the TS field in all types of
CP to carry output results of the M-hmac and O-
hmac. The length of the AF is 20 bytes in the SCP-O
model as compared to 12 bytes in the SCP-M model.
3.3. Proposed replay-preventing mechanism
We design a replay attack protection mechanism based
on threshold timeout window in order to verify fresh-
ness of the received CP. The replay attack protection
mechanism is accomplished by tagging each outgoing
CP with an identifier, which is the creation time of that
particular CP. We formalize and determine five distinct
threshold timeout windows, which are called TORTS,
TOCTS, TOACK, TOCF-End, and TOCF-End-ACK related to
the five SCP. They determine maximum acceptable age
of the corresponding SCP as presented in Figure 3.
In order to determine these five threshold timeout
windows, a number of IEEE 802.11 standard notations
[11] are used as presented in Table 2.
Now we define TSCP, as the required time to transmit








In Equation 1, LSCP is the length of the SCP and TSCP
is considered for all types of CP as TRTS, TCTS, TACK,
TCF-End, and TCF-End-ACK, which represent the required
time for transmission of the secure RTS, CTS, ACK,
CF-End, and CF-End-ACK packets, respectively. The
followings are the timeout formulization and the corre-
sponding values in both SCP-M and SCP-O models.
3.3.1. Timeout calculation in the SCP-M model
TOACK = TACK + Pt + St + SIFS = 343 us
TOCTS = TCTS + Pt + St + SIFS = 343 us
TORTS = TRTS + Pt + St + SIFS = 367 us
TOCF−End = TCF−End + Pt + St = 357 us
TOCF−End−ACK = TCF−End−ACK + Pt + St = 357 us
3.3.2. Timeout calculation in the SCP-O model
TOACK = TACK + Pt + St + SIFS = 375 us
TOCTS = TCTS + Pt + St + SIFS = 375 us
TORTS = TRTS + Pt + St + SIFS = 399 us
TOCF−End = TCF−End + Pt + St = 389 us
TOCF−End−ACK = TCF−End−ACK + Pt + St = 389 us
Upon receiving a CP, the recipient must first verify its
freshness using the corresponding timeout value and the
following equation.
0 ≤ CCT − received TS filed ≤ TOSCP
∴ where TOSCP is corresponding thereshold time window
(2)
In Equation 2, CCT is the current clock time
announced by the secure timing synchronization func-
tion in the beacon frames [12]. If the above condition is
met, the received SCP is deemed fresh and is old if
otherwise. Old CP will be discarded immediately by the

















Send CF-End or  
CF-End-ACK 
Wait Idle 
Figure 3 Conceptual description of the five threshold timeouts
and their effects.
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3.4. Proposed M-hmac
The design of M-hmac is motivated by resource con-
straints in wireless networks and to optimize the net-
work performance using the SCP-M model as compared
to the SCP-O model. National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) considers an optional transfor-
mation function called finalization function (g) which
can be used to derive the desired output from the origi-
nal output of hash functions. This can provide more
options to achieve the best desired hash results out of
hash functions. Therefore, we provide the required mod-
ifications over the finalization function which can offer
the following advantages.
• NIST has agreed on the presence of this function
[13]. Therefore, we utilize this advantage to optimize
the performance of the SCP-M model without tem-
pering the basic structure of the HMAC-SHA1 algo-
rithm. This can avoid unknown security flaws in the
SCP-M model.
• NIST does not define any specific algorithm for
this function. This feature can eliminate any limita-
tion to provide the desired transformations in effort
to enhance the efficiency of the SCP-M model.
• Since the compression function of the M-hmac is
similar to HMAC-SHA1, its security analysis can be
accomplished as the HMAC-SHA1 which is already
well known.
The proposed M-hmac applies the same compression
function as the HMAC-SHA1 algorithm with two new
additional rounds to the algorithm in the finalization
function. The first round of M-hmac includes a new
function that involves the stream cipher encryption
algorithm while the second round of M-hmac constructs
the value of the AF field.
3.4.1. First round of M-hmac
In this round, there are three fields that are used as
inputs to the compression function along with the FK-
SCP-M as the key, namely, the TS, duration, and recei-
ver address. The output result is 160-bit final chaining
variable (FCV) that moves into the new stream cipher
function (SCF). The SCF first divides the 160-bit FCV
into two halves as left and right halves with the size of
80-bit each. Then, the SCF breaks both the left and the
right halves separately into chunks of the same length of
4-bit each.
The SCF considers the right half chunks as keystream
and the left half chunks as input message. The encryp-
tion process in the SCF is accomplished by combining
each left half chunk with the corresponding right half
chunk using XOR operation to generate a new 160-bit
stream. The result is called transformed chaining vari-
able (TCV) which acts as the input to the second round
of M-hmac.
3.4.2. Second round of M-hmac
This round takes the 160-bit TCV and divides it into 5
words of 32-bit each, which are TCV0, TCV1, TCV2,
TCV3, and TCV4. Next, XOR operation is applied over
all the words in order to generate a 96-bit output in hex
format (H). We call this 96-bit output as value of AF
field (VAF), which is placed in the AF field of the SCP.
The process of extracting the 96-bit VAF out of the
160-bit TCV is accomplished as follows.
NTCV2 = TCV0 ⊕ TCV4
NTCV1 = TCV1 ⊕ TCV3
NTCV0 = TCV0 ⊕ TCV2
VAF = NTCV0 ‖ NTCV1 ‖ NTCV2
where ‖ is concatination
The overall process of the both rounds in M-hmac is
presented in Figure 4.
3.5. Defense process by the SCP-O and SCP-M models
Basically, defense process by the SCP-M and SCP-O
models comprises two main phases: the generation
phase and the verification phase as follows.
3.5.1. Generation phase
This phase is carried out by the sender station to gener-
ate values of the TS and AF security fields. The sender
station determines the creation time of the outgoing CP
to be placed into the TS field. Then, the sender must
generate value of the AF field. Therefore, the TS, dura-
tion, and receiver address are considered as inputs to the
M-hmac/O-hmac along with the FK-SCP-M/FK-SCP-O
keys. After the calculation of the sender VAF (S-VAF),
this value is tagged into the AF field. Once this is done,
the CP will be transmitted to the intended receiver.
3.5.2. Verification phase
This phase is carried out by the receiver station to verify
the freshness and validity of the received CP. Upon
receiving the CP, the receiver station will immediately
discard the packets that do not have any TS or AF
security elements based on the ground of wrong format.
Otherwise, the receiver must first check the freshness of
the received CP. Doing freshness check as the first line
Table 2 System parameters
System parameter Parameter value
Short inter-frame space, SIFS 10 μs
Slot time, St 20 μs
Basic bitrate, Br 2 Mbps
Physical bitrate, PHYr 1 Mbps
Physical header, PHYh 192 bits
Propagation delay time, Pt 1 μs
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of defense can significantly enhance the speed and effi-
ciency of the proposed models. By this way, the old CP
are discarded immediately by the receiver without even
wasting time to involve the authentication algorithm.
For the freshness check, the receiver station adheres to
Equation 2 and subtracts the current clock time from
the value in the TS field of the received CP. This is to























    FCV (160 bits)    
l0 l1 l2 l3   ………….. l17 l18 l19 r0 r1 r2 r3   ………….. r17 r18 r19 
    TCV (160 bits)    
Left Half (80 bits input message) Right Half (80 bits keystream) 
Break to 4 bits chunks Break to 4 bits chunks
TCV0 (32 bits) TCV1 (32 bits) TCV2 (32 bits) TCV3 (32 bits) TCV4 (32 bits) 





NTCV0 (32 bits) NTCV1 (32 bits) NTCV2 (32 bits) 
Figure 4 Structure of the proposed M-hmac.
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corresponding timeout value. If the condition is met, the
receiver considers the CP as fresh.
At this point, if the CP is CF-End or CF-End-ACK,
the receiver must verify their duration field. If the dura-
tion field of these CP is not zero, the packet is consid-
ered as an invalid packet because of its wrong format
and will be discarded. Otherwise, the recipient moves to
the next step to validate the authenticity of the sender
and integrity of the CP.
The receiver goes through the same process as the
sender to recalculate VAF, which is called Receiver
VAF (R-VAF). The receiver compares this calculated
R-VAF with the received S-VAF. If there is a match
between these two values, the packet is accepted and
its corresponding function is implemented. Otherwise
the packet is discarded by the receiver. The general
implementation process of the SCP-M model is pre-
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Figure 5 Defense process by the SCP-M/SCP-O models.
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3.6. Security analysis
In order to start DoS attacks against the wireless net-
works protected by the SCP-M and SCP-O models, the
attackers first have to generate valid forgery CP. Passing
the authentication and integrity check requires generat-
ing valid S-VAF for the forgery CP without knowing
value of the FKs. To achieve this, the attackers need to
carry out some hash-based attacks against the SCP-M
and SCP-O models. Therefore, in order to analyze secur-
ity of the SCP-M and SCP-O models we describe the
complexity of the common hash-based attacks against
these models while the following notations are used.
• Attack complexity: The complexity of an algorithm
is defined as amount of required efforts or number
of operations required to break the algorithm.
Therefore, unit measurement of the attack complex-
ity is number of attempts [14]. In this regard, the
security level of an algorithm is defined as the
amount of work required to break the algorithm
[15]. The unit measurement of the security level is
bits. Thus, if 2N attempt is the attack complexity,
the security level of the algorithm will be N bits.
• Length of the FK is denoted by k.
• Length of S-VAF is denoted by m.
• Given information: When an attacker attempts to
perform his malicious intents, he will use all avail-
able public known information to make the attacks
process faster and easier. Therefore, the attacker
knows the description of the algorithms used in the
system and format of the messages as well. The
attacker also can observe sequence of messages with
their corresponding S-VAF. However, what the
attacker does not know is value of the FK which is
one of the main inputs to generate S-VAF. The




(x1, z1), (x2, z2), ..., (xq, zq)
under unknown FK − SCP − M/FK − SCP − O
xi = Message , 1 ≤ i ≤ q
yi = FCV , Length of yi = n
zi = g(yi) = VAF , Length of zi = m
Length of FK = k
The description of the common hash-based attacks
against the SCP-M and SCP-O models along with their
complexity is presented as follows.
3.6.1. MAC guessing attack
MAC guessing attack [16] is when the attackers try to
find a valid S-VAF for their forgery CP by guessing it.
Since the attackers do not know the value of the key (i.
e., FK-SCP-M and FK-SCP-O), they have to guess all
possible values for the output result. The attacker ran-
domly generates a tag for one fixed message of his
choice and transmits it to the receiver. If by any chance,
the tag is valid the receiver accepts the message and the
attack is successful. However, if the tag is not verified as
a valid tag by the recipient, the attacker has to repeat
the process and generate another tag for his fixed mes-
sage until finding a valid tag. According to [16], com-
plexity of this attack is directly proportional to the
length of tag and the applied key. The attack complexity
is described as follows.
Problem: MAC guessing attack using the given
information
Goal: Attacker tries to find a valid z for his own x
such that x ∉ {x1, x2,...,xq}
Attack complexity: MIN(2m-1, 2k-1) attempts
Hence, complexity of the best attack is about 2159 and
295 for the SCP-O and SCP-M models, respectively.
3.6.2. Key recovery attack
In order to have full access over the wireless channel,
the attacker attempts to figure out the value of the
key applied through the communications [17]. By
exposing value of the key, the attacker can make any
valid S-VAF. In order to implement this attack, the
attacker determines a fixed input message along with
a randomly selected value for the secret key. He sends
these values to the same MAC algorithm applied in
the target system and generates the tag. Then, the
attacker appends the tag to his fixed message to trans-
mit to the receiver in the target system. If the recipi-
ent accepts the message, it means that the attacker
has the correct secret key. Otherwise, he has to try
another secret key with his fixed message and this
process is repeated by the attacker until finding the
correct value for the key. Complexity of this attack
against the SCP-M and SCP-O models is considered
as follows.
Problem: Key recovery attack using the given
information
Goal: Attacker tries to find a valid FK’ such that FK’ =
FK
Attack complexity: 2k-1attempts
Since the length of the keys for the both SCP-M and
SCP-O models is the same, to figure out the correct
value of the FK-SCP-M and FK-SCP-O, the attacker has
2159 possible values to examine.
3.6.3. Forgery attack
In order to implement this attack, the attacker tries to
determine a valid tag for his new forgery message,
which has not already been transmitted to the network.
Forgery attacks in terms of second preimage [17] or
birthday forgery [18] are carried out by the attackers to
find valid tags. The complexity of these attacks is mea-
sured as follows.
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Problem: Second preimage forgery attack using the
given information
Goal: Attacker by having (xt, zt) where: 1 ≤ t ≤ q tries
to make his message x such that z = zt
Attack complexity: 2m-1attempts
The work factor to make a new SCP matching with a
given S-VAF using the second preimage forgery method
is 2m-1. Thus, the complexity of the second preimage
attack is about 2159 and 295 for the SCP-O and SCP-M
models, respectively.
Problem: Birthday forgery attack using the given
information
Goal: Attacker by having (xt, yt) where: 1 ≤ t ≤ q, tries
to make his message x such that y = yt
Attack complexity: 2m/2 attempts
The workload to carry out forgery attack using the
birthday method is 2m/2. Thus, complexity of the birth-
day forgery attack is about 280 and 248 for the SCP-O
and SCP-M models, respectively.
4. Experimental design
We have developed a simulation environment using
omnetpp to implement the SCP-M and SCP-O models
and evaluate their performance. The simulation environ-
ment, experiments methodology, and performance
metrics that are used to evaluate the models are further
described in the following sections.
4.1. Simulation environment
The simulation environment consists of three types of
entities, namely attacker station, authorized wireless sta-
tions, and authorized AP. In this environment, there are
two types of wireless networks, namely, the protected
and unprotected. The unprotected wireless network
adheres to the current MAC layer of IEEE 802.11 stan-
dard, which is known to be vulnerable to DoS attacks. In
contrast, the protected wireless network adheres to the
proposed models as the secure MAC layers. Two new
MAC layers are created and written in C++ to include
the required codes for each proposed model separately.
In general, each wireless host (80211-Host) has a wire-
less NIC (80211-NIC) that includes the PHY and MAC
layers. The unprotected wireless network utilizes the
current MAC layer (802.11-Current-MAC layer). In
contrast, the protected networks utilize two secure
MAC layers as the proposed models, namely, the
802.11-SCP-M and 802.11-SCP-O MAC layers. Figure 6
shows these secure and insecure MAC layers.
The structure of the unprotected wireless network and
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802.11-MAC layer 
Figure 6 Secure and insecure MAC layers in the simulation environment.
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environment are developed exactly the same to provide
fair conditions during evaluation of the models (Figure 7).
The two wireless stations in the unprotected network
are wireless station1 (WS1) and wireless station2 (WS2)
connected to the AP. All the WS1, WS2, and AP follow
the 802.11 standard model.
In the protected wireless network using the SCP-M,
the two wireless stations are protected wireless station1
(PWS1) and protected wireless station2 (PWS2) con-
nected to the protected AP (PAP). All the PWS1,
PWS2, and PAP follow the SCP-M model.
In the protected wireless network using the SCP-O,
the two wireless stations are protected wireless station1
(PWS1) and protected wireless station2 (PWS2) con-
nected to the PAP. All the PWS1, PWS2, and PAP fol-
low the SCP-O model.
In the above environment, the sender transmits 1000
bytes TCP packets with 0.5 s intervals and 56 bytes
ICMP packets with 1 s intervals to the AP which in turn
transmits them to the receiver. The attacker station is
configured to trigger different types of DoS attacks
against the three networks using different types of SCP.
For all types of the attacks, we consider the attack cycle
as 100 false SCP per second (0.01 s attack rate), while the
duration field of all these false packets is set to the maxi-
mum possible value which is 32767 μs. The reason is a
larger duration filed can keep the NAV reserved for a
longer time. This consequently denies the channel from
the authorized users for a longer time which can extend
impact of the attacks as the attackers do in real world.
4.2. Experiments methodology
An extensive set of experiments are carried out to
implement, evaluate, and compare the performance of
the protected wireless networks using the proposed
SCP-M and SCP-O models and the unprotected wireless
network using the current 802.11 model.
According to the IEEE 802.11, there are two types of
communication modes in wireless networks, namely, the
enabled and disabled RTS/CTS handshakes. Since the
proposed models directly deal with the wireless CP,
enabling or disabling the handshake can provide signifi-
cant differences in the network performance. This moti-
vates us to perform the experiments under two general
scenarios as enabled and disabled handshakes. Each of
these scenarios includes two more sub-scenarios to eval-
uate the models performance under DoS attacks and
under normal conditions without any attacks.
Unprotected wireless network using 
802.11-Current MAC layer 
Protected wireless network using 
802.11-SCP-M MAC layer 
Protected wireless network using 


















PWS1: Sender PWS2: Receiver 
PAP 
PWS1: Sender PWS2: Receiver 
PAP 
Figure 7 Structure of the three types of wireless networks in the simulation environment.
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Throughout the experiments, the total implementation
time is considered 90 s. In the scenarios under DoS
attack, the 90 s is divided in three 30-s time frames to
represent duration before attack (B.attack), during attack
(D.attack), and after attack (A.attack). For the scenarios
under normal conditions with no attacks, these three
30-s time frames are denoted as 0-30, 30-60, and 60-90
s to have identical time frames for comparisons.
4.3. Performance metrics
The following network metrics are investigated to evalu-
ate performance of the models.
• Throughput: It is computed by dividing the amount
of data received by the destination node with the time
taken to arrive at this node.
• Delay: It is the average amount of time taken by a
packet to travel from the originating node until it is suc-
cessfully received at the destination node.
• Performance improvement ratio: It is to show the
overall percentage of the throughput improvement in
the wireless networks using the SCP-M model as com-
pared to the SCP-O model under DoS attacks and
under normal conditions.
• Security cost: It is percentage of the network per-
formance degradation caused by the proposed models as
compared to the standard model under normal condi-
tions with no attacks.
• Packet lost ratio (PLR): It is measured as the num-
ber of dropped ICMP packets divided by the total num-
ber of sent ICMP packets during the attacks.
• Round trip response time (RTT): It is the time
required for ICMP packets to travel from the source to
the destination and back again.
5. Results and analysis
In this section, the results from implementation of the
proposed models are presented. We evaluate the perfor-
mance of the SCP-M and SCP-O models to determine
and compare their capabilities. These comparisons are
accomplished to assist in selecting the more appropriate
model for the wireless networks in order to prevent
DoS attacks. By comparing the results and considering
the required security level along with the system limita-
tions, capabilities, and requirements, the more efficient
model can be applied. Performance of the proposed
models is evaluated in the following sections.
5.1. Effect of disabled handshake
This scenario evaluates and compares performance of
the protected wireless networks using the proposed
SCP-M and SCP-O models and unprotected wireless
network using the current IEEE 802.11 model when
the RTS/CTS handshake is not involved in the
communications.
5.1.1. Performance analysis under DoS attacks
Figures 8 and 9 show the results from the delay and
RTT along with the throughput and PLR as presented
in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
According to the above results, we can see that both






Figure 8 Delay comparison.
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802.11 model, have successfully prevented wireless DoS
attacks. Before the attacker begins the attacks, normal
traffics are observed in the both protected and unpro-
tected networks. However, immediately after triggering
the attacks, the unprotected network is flooded with
large number of false CP that consume the available
bandwidth. As the result, the network is no longer cap-
able to handle valid requests made from any authorized
user. Consequently, the communication between the sta-
tions is broken and the network throughput quickly
drops to null. The remarkable difference between the
null throughput of the current model with the normal
throughput of the proposed models during the attacks,
as well as the 36% PLR of the standard model as com-
pared to the null PLR of the proposed models show that
SCP-M and SCP-O models have successfully prevented
the attacks.
After the attacks, we observed a high peak in amount
of delay and RTT of the standard model for a short
time. The cause of this high peak is related to some
already scheduled packets. Before starting the attacks,
some packets were in the queue waiting to be
transmitted. When the attack starts, the AP is over-
loaded by the false CP thus dropping all the upcoming
new packets. The packets that were in the queue prior
to the attack still remain there because the AP is not
able to do any more services. When the AP was back to
its normal conditions and regained ability to provide
services for its users, it began to transmit the queued
packets. Therefore, these packets experienced significant
amount of delay. After transmitting all these queued
packets, the new upcoming packets are transmitted nor-
mally. In contrast, because the proposed models are not
affected by the attacks, there is no peak in their amount
of delay and RTT after the attacks.
Based on the results, we observed 100% performance
improvement for the protected wireless networks by
adopting the proposed models as compared to the stan-
dard model under different types of attacks. The results
also show that using the SCP-M in the network will
improve the network performance under the DoS
attacks, up to 7% compared to the SCP-O model.
 
Figure 9 RTT comparison.
Table 3 Throughput comparison (Mbps)
Model B.attack D.attack A.attack
802.11 1.771 0 1.673
SCP-M 1.622 1.609 1.616
SCP-O 1.576 1.502 1.604









802.11 90 56 34 36
SCP-M 90 90 0 0
SCP-O 90 90 0 0
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5.1.2. Performance analysis under no attacks
The results of the delay, RTT, and throughput under
normal conditions are presented in Figures 10, 11, and
Table 5 respectively.
Based on the above results, we observed that when the
wireless network is under normal condition without the
presence of the false CP, performance of the proposed
models is very close to the standard model. Considering
the fact that security comes in price of extra overheads,
the small difference between performance of the SCP-M
and SCP-O models with the standard model proves that
adopting these models does not impose remarkable com-
putational overhead to the wireless networks. The security
cost of 9% in SCP-M and 12% in SCP-O can be considered
negligible as compared to their outstanding achievements
of 100% performance improvement under different types
of DoS attacks. The results also showed that adopting the
SCP-M model provides 2% performance improvement as
compared to the SCP-O model when the handshake is dis-
abled during the normal transmissions.
5.2. Effect of enabled handshake
The scenario of enabled handshake evaluates and com-
pares performance of the protected wireless networks
using the proposed SCP-M and SCP-O models and
unprotected wireless network using the current IEEE
802.11 model when the RTS/CTS handshake is used dur-
ing the communications between the authorized stations.
5.2.1. Performance analysis under DoS attacks
The results of delay and throughput are presented in
Figure 12 and Table 6, respectively.
The above results prove the fact that enabling the
RTS/CTS handshake causes significant influence over
the entire network performance regardless if the net-
work is protected or not. In this case, the amount of
delay that packets experience is higher than when the
handshake is disabled. The reason for this increase is
because the handshake process needs extra time to be
accomplished. The originator node must wait until the
handshake is completed before the actual data transmis-
sion takes place. This sending RTS and waiting for CTS
before any data transmission is time consuming while at
the same time data are waiting in the transmitter buffer
to be sent. In contrast, with a disabled handshake, data
are sent immediately as soon as they are ready, which in
turn decreases the overall amount of delay.
These results are also consistent with the previous
results, where the proposed models unlike the standard
model have successfully prevented the DoS attacks.
Comparing the null throughput of the standard model
with the normal throughput of the proposed models
during the DoS attacks indicate 100% improvement in
the wireless network performance. In addition, adopting
the SCP-M model in the wireless networks has resulted
in better performance as compared to the SCP-O model
in terms of higher throughput, less delay, and RTT. The
SCP-M model managed to enhance the overall system
performance by up to 11% during the attacks, which is
4% higher than when the handshake is disabled.
5.2.2. Performance analysis under no attacks
The results of delay and throughput are presented in
Figure 13 and Table 7, respectively.
 
Figure 10 Delay comparison.
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From the above results, we observe that under normal
conditions, the performance of the SCP-M model is
close to the standard model. The security cost of the
SCP-M and SCP-O models are about 13 and 20%,
under normal conditions. Thus, these results confirm
our previous results as better performance of the SCP-
M model in terms of higher throughput, and less delay,
and RTT compared to the SCP-O model and thereby
prove advantage of the proposed M-hmac over the ori-
ginal O-hmac. Adopting the SCP-M model in wireless
network can improve the overall system performance by
up to 6% compared to the SCP-O model which is 3%
higher than when the RTS/CTS handshake is disabled.
The reason of higher security improvement of the
SCP-M model over the SCP-O model when the hand-
shake is enabled compared to a disabled handshake is
related to the nature of the handshake. When the hand-
shake is used during the communications, using the
SCP-O model imposes extra 8 bytes to the network by
each RTS, CTS, and ACK packets. In this case, the total
overhead of each successful data transmission using the
SCP-O model is about 24 bytes more than the SCP-M
model. In contrast, when the handshake is disabled the
extra 8 bytes is imposed to the network by only ACK
packet which makes the difference between the imposed
overhead by the SCP-M model less than the SCP-O
model.
5.3. Functional analysis of the proposed models
According to the SCP-M and SCP-O models, upon receiv-
ing a wireless CP, the recipient must first verify its fresh-
ness and then its validity to accept or reject the CP. Thus,
the functionality of the models varies depending on value
of the TS and AF. In this section, functionality of the pro-
posed models is investigated upon receiving the CP either
belong to the attacker or the authorized users. The results
are presented for the SCP-M model as follows.
5.3.1. Influence of arriving forgery CP
Figure 14 shows how the SCP-M model functions when
the DoS attack starts at 30th second and the first
Figure 11 RTT comparison.
Table 5 Throughput comparison (Mbps)
Model 0-30 s 30-60 s 60-90 s
802.11 1.771 1.802 1.793
SCP-M 1.622 1.637 1.602
SCP-O 1.576 1.557 1.573
Table 6 Throughput comparison (Mbps)
Model B.attack D.attack A.attack
802.11 1.500 0 1.397
SCP-M 1.318 1.210 1.358
SCP-O 1.247 1.086 1.269
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forgery CP belong to the attacker is received by the
recipient.
As the above figure shows, upon receiving the CP, the
secure MAC layer of the SCP-M model (80211-SCP-M)
first determines the packet specifications. The above
packet is an RTS packet with 36 bytes length, 30 s TS
field, and 32767 μs duration value which has been












Figure 13 Delay comparison.
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attempts to verify freshness of the received RTS. There-
fore, as the figure shows, subtraction of the current
clock time and TS is calculated by the replay-preventing
mechanism. The result of the calculation is less than the
TORTS, therefore although the RTS packet is forgery, it
can pass the freshness check.
Then the recipient attempts to verify validity of the
AF security field. At this step, since the attacker does
not know value of the key, he is not able to set a valid
value for the AF field. Thus, the AF field of the received
RTS packet is not valid. Consequently, although the
packet is fresh, it is discarded as an invalid CP and
thwarts the attack.
As it is observed, since the first forgery CP considered
fresh, for the first forgery packet both TS and AF verifi-
cations are carried out. However after that, since the
forgery packet is getting old over the time, the second
forgery packet cannot pass the freshness check anymore
and without even checking the AF the second and all
the subsequent forgery CP are discarded. The live cap-
turing of this state is shown in Figure 15.
As the above figure shows, the secure MAC layer of
the SCP-M model (80211-SCP-M) determines the
packet as an RTS packet with 36 bytes length, 30 s TS,
and 32767 μs duration field received by the AP. This
packet is regarded as a old CP through the freshness
check and is discarded without even checking the AF
field. This significantly speeds up the overall process of
the proposed models and makes them more efficient to
apply in the wireless networks. During the entire attacks
time, the results show that only the first forgery CP at
the beginning of the attack can pass the freshness check
while it is discarded by the proposed models because of
the wrong AF field. All the subsequent forgery CP other
than the first one are discarded as old CP by the replay
preventing mechanism.
5.3.2. Influence of arriving authorized CP
When the destination node receives a valid CP, since
the legitimate originator node has the correct value of
the key, it is able to make a valid AF value in addition
to a fresh value for the TS field. The process of passing
both freshness and authentication verifications for legal
CP is shown in Figure 16.
As the above figure shows, after determining the spe-
cification of the received CP by the 80211-SCP-M MAC
Table 7 Throughput comparison (Mbps)
Model 0-30 s 30-60 s 60-90 s
802.11 1.500 1.497 1.448
SCP-M 1.318 1.311 1.311
SCP-O 1.247 1.271 1.231
 
Figure 14 Discarding forgery CP with fresh TS and invalid AF by the SCP-M model.
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layer, first the TS field of the packet is verified. Since
value of the TS field is recognized fresh, the AF field of
the packet is verified. Because the packet is originated
from authorized user that knows correct value of the
key, the AF field is valid as well and the packet is
accepted by the recipient as a valid CP.
During implementation of the models it was observed
that, like the standard model, the SCP-M and SCP-O
Figure 15 Discarding forgery CP with old TS by the SCP-M model.
 
Figure 16 Accepting valid CP with fresh TS and valid AF by the SCP-M model.
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models do not discard any valid CP which proves that
under normal conditions the models correctly follow the
IEEE 802.11 standard. Based on the obtained results,
under normal conditions without presence of the attack-
ers, both freshness and authenticity of the authorized
CP must be verified which can consume system
resources. To avoid this issue and to get the best perfor-
mance of the wireless networks, enabling the SCP-M
and SCP-O models after detection of the DoS attacks
can reduce the overall overheads and maintain maxi-
mum network throughput. In this case, since the pro-
posed models are only used when the DoS attacks have
occurred, they are light on resource usages which make
the models significantly efficient for the limited
resources wireless networks.
6. Conclusion
The unprotected CP are capable to make the entire
wireless networks vulnerable to DoS attacks and result
in serious damages in the critical areas where constant
availability of the networks, resources, and services is a
prime priority. In this study, we proposed two new dis-
tinct models, SCP-M and SCP-O, to prevent wireless
DoS and replay attacks by protecting the CP. The pro-
posed SCP-M and SCP-O models were evaluated
through extensive set of scenarios and experiments. The
obtained results proved that while the standard model
failed against the attacks, both the proposed models
have successfully prevented the wireless DoS and replay
attacks. The results also showed that the best perfor-
mance of the both models is obtained when the RTS/
CTS handshake is disabled. In this case, the perfor-
mance of the SCP-M and SCP-O models is considerably
close to the standard 802.11 model with a negligible
security cost. Results of comparison between SCP-M
and SCP-O models also proved that by adopting the
SCP-M in wireless networks, the network performance
is enhanced. This proves that the proposed M-hmac as
underlying authentication algorithm of the SCP-M
model provides higher efficiency to access to the system
resources and services while maintaining a sufficient
level of security.
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